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CASEBOOK CRITERIA: ON FIRST
LOOKING INTO HAAR AND LIEBMAN'S
PROPERTY AND LAW
Samuel Bassett Abbott*

PROPERTY AND LAW. By Charles M. Haar and Lance Liebman.
Boston: Little, Brown. 1977. Pp. xxviii, 1144. $22.00.
This is a review of a recently published property casebook.
Why it would interest anyone other than property teachers unhappy with their current materials or prospective teachers of
property, I cannot think-unless I can say something more generally relevant to first-year instruction or the use of written materials with the case method.
I proceed by setting forth several commonplace criteria regarding property (or any) casebooks, explicate them a little, and
then evaluate Property and Law by means of them.
1. A casebook is not a telephone book. The average firstyear law student must spend anywhere from six to twelve hours
a week between the covers of his property casebook. Some of our
law-book publishers condemn the student to an unrelieved monotony of small type, ugly typefaces, and narrow columns without
maps or illustrations. Maps are especially helpful in property
cases, in which a complex verbal description of the premises only
beclouds the student mind. Illustrations are generally thought a
luxury. I would concede that a photograph of a portrait of Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., may not add much to one's understanding
of his opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 1 But the cumulative impact of picturing parties and judges, as well as the geography of the case, reminds the student that behind rules of law
and legal hypotheticals are human judgments in a historical context about the problems of real people. This reminder is worthwhile.
Haar and Liebman-and Little, Brown, their publisher-win
high praise in this respect. The book is attractively designed,
readable, and dotted with photographs and maps which the student eye can rest upon and the student mind can ponder. I should
add that Little, Brown's designs set a standard for other casebook
publishers.
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston University. B.A. 1963, Harvard University; J.D.
1969, University of California at Berkeley; LL.M., 1972, Yale University.-Ed.
1. 260 U.S. 393 (1922), reprinted in C. HAAR & L. LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW 971
(1977).
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2. The selection and organization of materials must be coherent, must be progressive, and must illuminate the basic questions facing any system of property rules. This is the heart of the
matter.· I have yet to see a table of contents for a property casebook which was a self-evident justification for the order or selection of topics. Sometimes topics are arranged historically, beginning with estates in land and ending with zoning. But the principle- whatever its justification-is not consistently applied. I am
not arguing that there is, necessarily, one correct order for topics
in a first-year property course. I am arguing instead that an arbitrary or random ordering demoralizes the beginning student and
leaves him unassured that the basics have been covered when the
course ends with one-third of the casebook unassigned and undiscussed. To the extent that developing skills rather than covering
the subject matter is the primary task of the first-year curriculum, topics should be organized to accomplish that purpose.
Haar and Liebman have divided their book into six parts:
private property, estates and the landlord-tenant estate, controlling the future, land in commerce, shared use, and public property. The first part belongs first, as it deals with concepts like
sovereignty, possession, appropriation, and prescription which
are basic to establishing any private property system. The premise is presumably that one should begin a property course with
private property. This is surely defensible-given our legal system and the student's perceptions of it. Beyond Part One, however, it does not seem to matter which part comes next, and the
parts themselves are internally incoherent. The "estates and
landlord-tenant estate" is chiefly concerned with the development of the implied warranty of habitability, rent control, and
public housing. 2 "Shared use" includes concurrent estates, nonpossessory interests, and zoning. "Public property" turns out not
to be public at all; it treats the taking clause of the fifth amendment, copyright, and procedural due process. The introductions
to each part make no real effort to locate the student in a meaningful progression or to explain how what is to follow builds on
what has gone before. Nor could they, for the parts themselves
are loose aggregations of material that develop various answers to
the question, "What is property?"3
The matter of selection of materials is equally important and
2. 129 out of 209 pages in this part are devoted to these topics.
3. On the other hand, within chapters the organization is much more helpful. Chap•
ter 17, chiefly on real covenants, and chapter 18 on zoning are very illuminating develop•
ments of these topics.
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especially critical to a first-year property course. John Rumbach
surveyed 500 property teachers in 1976 and concluded:
The basic property course as taught across the country is in
reality a rather hugely diverse collection of highly different
courses. Apart from teaching the Estate System (half of the instructors using less than five hours for this), landlord-tenant and
the law of servitudes of various kinds, they have little consistently
in common other than that their subject matters deal more or less
witlrinterests in things. The approach to treating the fundamentals of the law with respect to things, the question which aspects
are fundamental, or even whether the first-year course should be
largely devoted to fundamentals at all appear to be subjects of very
basic disagreement.
·
Perhaps there is a place in the first-year required curriculum
for presenting a miscellany of laws dealing with a particular socially relevant phenomenon-such as property, or for that matter
transportation, energy or the environment. Perhaps there is not.
Perhaps the "fundamental" and "general" part of property law
can be covered in a small fraction of the time given to the basic
property course. Perhaps it cannot. This survey will not answer
these questions and this report of the survey should not attempt
to. But the survey does, I think, raise these questions, and credible
answers to them must be forthcoming if a future role for the basic
property course is to be justified.'

The "very basic disagreement" about "the fundamentals of
the law with respect to things" which require "credible answers"
"if a future role for the basic property course is to. be justified"
sounds ominous. One readily imagines property banished to an
elective status for students preparing to be estate planners or real
estate lawyers because of its quarrelsome instructors and lack of
pedagogical integrity as an introductory required course. This
possibility will become realistic if pressures toward specialization
intensify and militate against a required first-year curriculum, or
if advocacy-skills training courses like legal methods, legal writing, or moot court begin to demand more credit hours in the first
year.
But curricular politics are a secondary problem for property
teachers. The controversy about what is fundamental to a property course is caused, in my judgment, by a failure to develop
property theory to the level of the metalegal. To search for property theory is to search for underlying concepts, recurrent questions, and basic social functions of property and to order them so
4. Jumbach, What Is Taught in the First Year Property Cours1;?, 29 J.
459, 469 (1978).

LEGAL

Eouc.
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that property will have the coherence of a contracts course built
around a paradigm of bargained-for exchange or a torts course
built around concepts of personhood, harm, causation, fault and
compensation. Haar and Liebman are not much help in this
search. They have elected a smorgasbord approach to coverage
and include chapters on trusts, wills, water rights, public housing, land finance, intellectual property, and the "new property"
interests protected by the due process clause. Given this eclecticism, several omissions are striking. The rule against restraints
on alienation is not mentioned, despite its current relevance to
condominium law (which is mentioned). Questions of eminent
domain law other than the taking problem are omitted (What is
a public purpose? What is just compensation?). Nuisance law
was apparently deleted just prior to publication. (A discussion
that never took place is referred to in a chapter introduction, 3 and
Boomer u. Atlantic Cement Co. is cited in the table of cases to a
page on which no reference to it appears.) 8 It is important to
compare nuisance law with real covenants, zoning, and conditional fees as land use controls. Again, I argue not that a property
course properly grounded in theory cannot be taught without
these topics, but that the book's general inclusiveness and atheoretical character make the omission puzzling and inexplicable.
What Haar and Liebman obviously intend is that the student make a beginning in every area of property law to which
advanced courses relate. Either that, or they intend to leave the
question of selection (and sequence) entirely to the teacher. This
decision is costly, for, as noted infra, the interdisciplinary materials are merely excerpts and some case editing is severe. Some of
the coverage is necessarily thin. A sixty-page chapter such as
"Financing the Land Transaction" can hardly hope to impart
competence to the future practitioner. It does not seem justified
for exposing the students to theoretical questions not raised elsewhere or affording practice in an analytical skill, such as statutory analysis, which is peculiarly relevant to these materials.7
-1nstead the authors justify it as "basic background." 8 But why
use a casebook to provide "basic background"? Why not assign
collateral reading?
5. C. HAAR, & L. LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 703.
6. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870,309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). The page on which it does
not appear is page 933.
7. The authors seek to pull together the land finance materials with a problem, the
"Sutton Town House Case." The problem approach is, of course, adaptable to other parts
of the course.
8. C. HAAR & L. LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 475.
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3. A casebook is not a treatise. Too many casebooks, especially in subsequent editions, tend to take on some of the characteristics of a treatise. They grow monstrous, so that little more
than one-half the material is ever discussed in class. The presentation of statutes and cases becomes weighted down with extensive bibliographies for further reading, summarized "note" cases,
and, following a principal case, notes and questions which the
authors use not to illuminate that case, but to introduce additional material in the same subject area to which they, or their
publishers, could not justify devoting more space. This is a trend
to be resisted, because students are paying for material they don't
use and are encouraged to rely on the casebook rather than developing their own bibliography and consulting real treatises on difficult or important points.
Happily Haar and Liebman have resisted this trend. For the
most part their notes include invariably interesting background
materials on the cases, and they are quite willing to leave a case
without comment.
4. Basic skills such as case, statutory, and problem analysis
ought to be identified, explained, and practiced. Graduate students learn better when they understand what they are supposed
to be learning. Yet it often comes as a shock to a first-year law
student to discover, late in the year, after he has anxiously asked
why the class will cover only one-half the materials or will not
finish the instructor's own syllabus, that the pedagogical objective is skills training: how "to think like a lawyer," how to analyze a case, parse a statute, unpack a complex problem, make a
persuasive argument. Must this be? Casebooks imply a teaching
method, the Socratic, and prepare the student for an examination
generally requiring an essay response to a complex problem. The
skills sought to be imparted in the substantive courses of the firstyear curriculum are not controversial. Indeed they are the subject
of monolithic agreement, as far as I am aware. Why shouldn't
they be identified, explained, and practiced by means of notes,
questions, and problems in the casebook itself?
In this respect Haar and Liebman are clearly of another
mind. Not only do they eschew any practical. discussion of the
"How do you read a case?" or "What is a holding?" sort that
many a reader may insist on consigning to the legal methods
course, but they do not generally follow cases with questions or
problems. Perhaps there is some difference between them on this
point, for a few questions do appear here and there. When, for
example, they hav.e explained conditional fees or the Rule
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Against Perpetuities, there are no problems for the student to
work to see if he or she has mastered the complexities of the Rule.
It is •possible, of course, for the teacher to supplement the text
with problems. But the absence of questions following the cases
would require a major project for any teacher who, like me, wants
the classroom discussion to center around a few questions carefully chosen to open up the complexities of the case and permit a
thoughtful critique of its reasoning, result, and social impact, and
who believes that students should ponder and prepare an answer
to these questions as they read the case.
5. Interdisciplinary materials are necessary for historical
understanding and for policy analysis within the framework of a
coherent social theory. If the first-year student is to understand
the development of property law, he needs to know some history
and philosophy. If he is to understand the function of property
law, he needs to know some anthropology, sociology, and economics. If classroom critique of leading cases is to rise above the
ventilation of "gut reactions," a common vocabulary for discussion, drawn from other disciplines, must be afforded. The concept
of economic efficiency needs careful definition and application.
The equities invoked in any property rights system-need, parity,
privacy, freedom, security, and conservation of irreplaceable resources (whether cultural or natural)-require clarification and
analysis.
· As Haar and Liebman point out in their introduction, their
materials are historical. 9 The student reads Blackstone and Kent,
Samuel Johnson, Francis Bacon, and Timothy Walker. Interesting notes and footnotes sketch the biographies of these men.
Holmes's letters shed light on several of his opinions. Generally
the historical materials are well handled and enrich the book. My
one cavil is with the use of Blackstone and Kent to provide the
feudal background to the concept of estates. Surely legal historians have left them far behind in reconstructing English land law
in the twelfth to fifteenth centuries. I am also nervous that the
classical formulations by Blackstone or Walker of, for example,
fee tails or conditional fees may confuse students as to their status today. The authors have added further notes as needed, but
the two-stage presentation may invite trouble in an area that I
find, year after year, generates more student anxiety th.an even
real covenants.
In Part One, "Private Property," Haar and Liebman ask the
9. · Id. at xxiv.
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student "to create an intellectual context for examining our society's present system of property rules." 10 What interdisciplinary
materials are provided? De Tocqueville comments on the expropriation of Indian lands. 11 Felix S. Cohen is represented by an
excerpt from a dialogue on the need for certainty in the distribution of property. 12 Agnello and Donnelly report the conclusions of
their study of the efficiency of private ownership in the oyster
industry.13 In the chapter on "Property in Land" a portion is
entitled, significantly I think, "Notes on the Ideology of Property." What follows are four paragraphs, three edited from the
chapter "On Property" of Locke's The Second Treatise of
Government and a brief excerpt from the early Marx which defines property but includes nothing that explains his critique of
private property.14 Freud is then quoted to answer Marx by criticizing the psychological premises of the communist demand for
the abolition of property.15 And Roger Brown is quoted to suggest
that children have a concept of property from an early age. 11
Whether that concept is innate or socialized and what the implications of its early appearance are for communism and socialism
are quite unclear. In the chapter on "Property in Water,~' Haar
and Liebman offer useful "Notes on Economic Analysis of Property Rights." Here the severe editing works better, and the concept of efficiency is clarified. Several problems follow to which the
student can apply the concept.
But with the exception of economic -efficiency, the materials
for creating an intellectual context for examining our system of
property rules are simply not adequate. The Marxist critique is
deferred until much later and even then is not presented with
sufficient fullness. Interdisciplinary materials receive summary
treatment throughout the book. ·Ellickson's important critique of
zoning is reduced to two paragraphs. 17 ~ note on the cost of buying and selling real estate summarizes recent federal legislative
10. Id. at 2.
11. Id. at 13-14 (quoting A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 366-67, 369
(1835)).
12. Id. at 31-32 (quoting Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 35766 (1954)).
13. Id. at 32-34 (quoting Agnello & Donnelly, Efficiency in the Oyster Industry, 18
J. LAw & ECON. 521, 522-23 (1975)).
14. Id. at 39-41 (quoting K. MARX, PRE-CAPITALIST ECONOMIC FORMATIONS 89, 92
(1857)).
15. Id. at 41 (quoting S. FREUD, CMµZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 112-13 (1930)).
16. Id. at 41 (quoting R. BROWN, A FtRST LANGUAGE: THE EARLY STAGES 195-97 (1973)).
17. Id. at 850-51 (quoting Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance
Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681 (1973))°.
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history, but on the need for and possibility of reform it cites only
two sentences from a speech by Chief Justice Burger to the American Law Institute. 18 The libertarian defense of private property
as the guarantor of liberty 19 and the environmentalist jurisprudence on the need for a new relationship between persons and
things, including rights for things, 20 are perspectives totally ignored.
6. Institutional analysis must accompany rule analysis. By
institutional analysis I mean exploring the remedies as administered by courts and agencies. These must be evaluated in context
before the adequacy of rights created by rules is properly assessed. The evaluation must include the question of institutional
competence to ascertain certain facts, make certain judgments,
or afford certain forms of relief. The institutional perspective is
more important in some parts of a property course than other
parts. Title recording systems, zoning, and the enforcement of
minimum standards in residential housing come readily to mind
as possibilities. The appellate court as an institution and its
shaping and reshaping of facts already filtered at trial can be
illuminated through a case history of some important appellate
opinion. Richard Danzig has already demonstrated the utility of
this approach in the contracts area. 21
Haar and Liebman provide adequate materials on the real
actions and the role of equity in enforcing property rights. The
zoning materials are a little weak on institutional analysis. Mandelker is quoted on the delegation of power and function in zoning
administration22 and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,
Inc. 23 is a principal case. But the tension between giving zoning
authorities flexibility and ensuring that judicial review of their
decisions uses clear standards is not clearly presented. In the
chapter on the implied warranty of habitability in landlordtenant law the authors include a helpful note on sanctions and
institutions. They end the chapter with Mazzonia v. Washington, 24 a case which presents the problem of the proper
18. Id. at 586 (quoting speech by Chief Justice Burger to American Law Institute
(May 21, 1974)).
19. See, e.g., F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM (1962).
20. See, e.g., Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, 45 So. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972).
21. R. DANZIG, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW: FURTHER READINGS ON
WELL-KNOWN CASES (1978).
22. C. HAAR & L. LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 954-56 (quoting Mandelker, Delegation
of Power and Function in Zoning Administration, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 60, 61-63).
23. Id. at 881-89 (quoting 426 U.S. 668 (1976)),
24. Id. at 310-13 (quoting 476 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
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institutional response to landlord abandonment. The debate on
the merits of the Torrens system also raises issues of institutional
competence. There are elements of case histories in the notes to
several cases, although none are complete, by which I mean they
do not include portions of the pleadings, the transcript, the opinion by the trial court, and interviews with parties or their attorneys.
7. Materials for a required, first-year course must interest
both the specialist and the non-specialist. One lion-solution to
this problem is to remit portions of the traditional course to advanced courses (future interests, estates and wills, land use planning) and to dwell on the remaining topics with increased intensity. If the objective of required first-year courses is to expose
students to the fundamental problems of a basic area of the law
and teach them skills, as discussed supra, then the requisite
depth is a grasp of property theory combined with coherent organization and enough material on a given topic to make evaluation of student mastery of it possible. The competence of a practitioner need not be attained. My hope is that the theoretical depth
I speak of would interest both the future specialist who will take
advanced property courses and the student resolutely headed for
criminal law, family law or personal injury litigation.
Ignoring for the moment my reservations about its organization, its lack of questions and problems, and its handling of interdisciplinary materials, I think Haar and Liebman have put together an interesting book. The use of maps and pictures and the
historical background and notes commenting further on the case
or the problem it addresses all help to dispel the mustiness that
characterizes those property casebooks that dwell on, but do not
place in their context, old cases and doctrinal complexities.
8. Principal cases must be more than hunks of black letter
law presented through the mouths of appellate judges. Of all the
obvious things I have said thus far, this is surely the most obvious. A case must also challenge students to develop analytic
skills, or provide a marginal fact situation that lays bare the
rationale of the applicable rule, or present questions of conflicting
values which the judges confront or fail to confront appropriately,
or raise issues of institutional capacity, or exemplify as part of a
sequence of cases a stage in the historical development of the law.
Sometimes a case must be included simply because it is the most
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recent authoritative pronouncement on a point, although that
doesn't necessarily mean that it should be treated in full if it lacks
other recommendations.
What I object to in casebook editing is the inclusion of cases
whose point is a direct quote from the Restatement or some scholarly article and which represent a judicial ratification of a previously nonauthoritative rule synthesis. I blame the appearance
of such cases, often heavily edited so that the student is spared
the search for relevance and the disentangling of collateral issues
as well as spared considering the arguments of the dissenters, on
the pressure for subject matter coverage. Langdell's ghost must
bewail such a corruption of the case method.
I cannot offer any opinion on Haar and Liebman's case selection and editing. Some of their cases are the common stock of
leading cases of any property casebook. It would be unfair to
appraise the unfamiliar cases without adopting the book, which
I, have not done, and teaching them.

*****
On balance I am disappointed. There are many things to
applaud in Property and Law, but they seem secondary. I could
do without them if I had to. My criticism seems to me basic-I
simply could not use this book to teach the sort of property course
I am trying to teach. Yet I suspect that neither Haar and Liebman nor their publishers are much interested in supplying the
sort of casebook I have in mind. I criticize them under criteria
they would not, at least on my interpretation of what those criteria require, accept.
Casebook publishing is big business where required first-year
courses are concerned. Would a more theoretical approach with
explicit skills training risk small sales because the theory would
be controversial and unappealing to the practitioner-teacher and
the skills training repellent to the jurisprudent-teacher? Perhaps.
Meanwhile, my search continues.

